图书招标中的不完全信息动态博弈及有效控制  

Incomplete Information Dynamic Game in Inviting Public-Bidding-Book-Purchase and Its Effective Control

作　　者：李霜梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东轻工职业技术学院,广州510300

出　　处：《图书情报工作》2008年第8期134-136,共3页Library and Information Service

摘　　要：用微观经济学的不完全信息动态博弈理论,分析图书馆文献资源采购招标中存在的图书馆和图书供应商间的博弈,指出存在于标书需求、价格及商务服务需求中的不完全信息影响着双方的决策,提出要从标书的撰写、评标和履标过程中准确地传递信息,建立完善的信号传递模型,消除信息的不平等,加强招标的全程控制进而提高招标质量。According to the incomplete information dynamic game theory of microeconornics, the suthor analyes the countermeasure between the library and the bookseller in the activity of inviting public bidding for book purchase, points out that incomplete information,which exists in the bidding paper,price and service demand, affects the desisions of two sides, In order to improve the quanlity of bids,people should exactly transfer the information, establish the perfect signal transmission model, remove the information＇ s inqequality, and strengthen the bids＇ whole course control.

关 键 词：图书采购 招标 不完全信息 动态博弈 信息不平等 

分 类 号：G253.1-F[文化科学—图书馆学]