政府偏好、公共品供给与转型中的财政分权  

Government Preference,Public Goods Supply and Fiscal Decentralization in Economic Transition

作　　者：丁菊红[1] 邓可斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院中国社会主义市场经济研究中心 [2]广东外语外贸大学国际工商管理学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2008年第7期78-89,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社科基金(07BGJ007)的研究资助;复旦大学第七届研究生创新基金;广东外语外贸大学青年项目(GW2006Q006)的资助

摘　　要：转型经济中中央政府和地方政府在偏好上的差异会深刻影响财政分权程度,同时改变着地方政府的激励结构,从而对公共品供给带来不同效果。本文在Besley模型的基础上,深入考察了这种偏好差异的形成过程,建立了中央与地方政府的动态博弈模型,解释了中国分权改革进程及最优分权程度的决定问题。In economic transition the different preference between the central government and local government deeply affects fiscal decentralization and the incentive structure. This paper analyses the course of the difference based on Besley＇s model and designs an incomplete contract model of central and local government. It explains the decision of decentralization in China. This paper proves that in the early development of economy because of under-decentralization the local government asks central government to increase the degree of decentralization. But with the development of economy, it will be over-decentralization and the local government will ask centre government to decreases the degree. However, if the economy goes a step further, the decentralization will achieve a equilibrium. The paper also discusses that with more people and worse economy, the degree of decentralization will increase ; while with less people and better economy the degree will decrease.

关 键 词：政府偏好 公共品供给 财政分权 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]