主体意义上的人格与客体意义上的人格--人格的双重内涵及我国民法典的保护模式选择  

Personality in Subjective and Objective Senses

作　　者：杨代雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学法学院讲师

出　　处：《环球法律评论》2008年第4期53-61,共9页Global Law Review

基　　金：2007年度国家社科基金青年项目“私权一般理论与民法体系构造模式的关系研究”(项目编号:07CFX039)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：人格具有双重内涵,即主体意义上的人格与客体意义上的人格。主体意义上的人格在现代民法中被表述为权利能力,它源于德国古典自然法学中的伦理人概念。客体意义上的人格概念源于雨果.多勒鲁斯,经过19世纪法学家的发展,成为现代人格权理论的逻辑基础。我国民法典应当对两种意义上的人格分别予以保护,人格权法应当独立成编。Personality has a dual intention, namely personality in the subjective sense and personality in the objective sense. The personality in the former sense is expressed in modern civil law as legal capacity. It originated from concept of personae morales in classical natural law in Germany. The personality in the latter sense originated from Hugo Donellus. It was developed by the jurists in the 19th century and became the logical basis of modern theory of personality. The Chinese Civil Code should provide separate protections for personality in both senses and should have an independent chapter on the right of personality.

关 键 词：人格 权利主体 权利客体 人格权 民法典 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学] G410[政治法律—法学]