中国财政分权的制度变迁:在博弈均衡与制度设计之间  

On the Institutional Change of Financial Sub-right of China:Between the Game Equilibrium and Institution Design

作　　者：何秋仙[1] 楼迎军[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学金融学院

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2008年第8期20-27,共8页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省社科规划课题<分税制下中央与地方财政互动关系研究>的研究成果之一;课题号:1060KZ406145

摘　　要：以分税制为主体的中国财政体制改革是一次重大制度创新。但分税制并不是横空出世的,它继承了某些"旧制度遗产"。分析其历时结构,可以发现分税制其实是一种重叠嵌入,它对之前的财政包干制既有保留,又有创新。从博弈均衡的观点出发,分税制之下的中央政府和地方政府之间是一种既抗衡又扈从的关系。本文从制度设计观点出发,用韦伯理想型分析与事权相匹配的财税体制下的中央与地方政府财税关系,讨论我国分税制存在的问题,并提出完善分税制的建议。The reform of fiscal system characterized by tax sharing is a tremendous innovation with some heritage from old systems.From the view of institution,we can see that tax-sharing system is overlapping.From the view of game equilibrium,we can see there are antagonism and obeisance relationship between the central and local governments.From the view of institution design,we can see that some problems are involved in the actual fiscal tax-sharing management system.Therefore,I hope I can do my bit to give some advice to help standardize our country's tax-sharing system.

关 键 词：分税制 建构理性 制度关联 博弈均衡 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]