基于纵向控制框架的上游厂商新产品特许决策研究  

Study on Franchising Strategy for Upstream Firm's New Products Within the Framework of Vertical Restraints

作　　者：陈国宏[1] 王秋菲[2] 李凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004 [2]沈阳建筑大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2008年第8期1196-1199,1216,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772097)

摘　　要：当上游企业拥有降低成本的技术创新时,利用Cournot数量竞争模型,在纵向控制的框架下,对纵向一体化和特许费两种技术许可策略进行了研究和比较.研究发现:新产品使下游厂商边际成本降幅较小时,上游厂商一体化策略的利润总是优于特许费的利润;若新产品使下游厂商的边际成本降幅较大时,下游产品同质的情况下,上游厂商特许费策略的利润优于一体化利润,下游产品异质的情况下,上游厂商一体化策略的利润优于特许费利润.对于社会福利而言,只有新产品对降低成本的作用很微弱时,上游厂商选择特许费策略才有利于社会福利的提高.The Cournot quantity competition model is applied to the comparative study on the two technological strategies, i. e. , vertical integration and franchise fee, within the framework of vertical restraints if the upstream firm supplies new products through technological innovation with cost reduced. It is found that the upstream firm＇s profits resulting from vertical integration is always higher than that from franchise fee if the new products cause the downstream firm＇ s marginal cost less reduced. And the upstream firm＇s profits resulting from franchise fee is higher than that from vertical integration under conditions that the quality of the new products supplied by downstream firm remain unchanged if the new products cause the downstream firm＇s marginal cost more reduced. However, when the quality of the new products supplied by downstream firm cannot be kept unchanged, the upstream firm＇s profits resulting from vertical integration is higher than that from franchise fee. As to the social welfare, it will be improved further only if the upstream firm chooses the strategy of franchise fee when the new products slightly affect the cost reduction.

关 键 词：纵向控制 纵向一体化 特许费 双方特许协议 上下游厂商 

分 类 号：F403.6[经济管理—产业经济]