嵌套博弈下的政府单边治理——对我国农村公共物品低效率供给的分析  

作　　者：符加林[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州轻工业学院经管学院,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《现代经济（现代物业下半月）》2008年第B07期51-53,共3页

摘　　要：农村公共物品的供给博弈不是孤立的,而是嵌套在其它博弈之中。农村基层现有的权力约束关系和由此而来的自上而下的供给决策体系,使参与人的策略受上级政府偏好的约束。参与人的决策不仅受公共物品供给博弈本身的影响,更受它所嵌入的行政权力关系的影响,这种嵌套形成了实质上的政府单边治理机制,这是导致农村公共物品供给效率不足的主因。The provision game of rural public goods is not isolated,but nested in other games. The existing restriction of power and decision-making system make the parters＇ strategies be restricted by superior government＇s preference in the gross roots. The parters＇ strategies are affected not only by the public goods game itself ,but also by the governmental power relation. This kind of nesting structure induces the governmental unilateral governance,and this is the main reason that leads to the insufficiency of provision efficiency.

关 键 词：农村公共物品 嵌套博弈 单边治理 效率 

分 类 号：F320[经济管理—产业经济] F224