基于博弈论的现货市场中发电厂商报价策略的研究  

Research on Gencos' Bidding Strategy in Spot Market Based on Theory of Game

作　　者：王树东[1] 史松涛[1] 李海涛[1] 李景志[1] 薛怡 

机构地区：[1]兰州理工大学电信学院,兰州730050 [2]西北电网有限公司调度中心,西安710048

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2008年第15期4233-4237,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

摘　　要：在电力市场环境下,发电厂商通常要在现货市场进行交易。一种有效合理的竟价模式就显得很重要,既要激励发电企业强化管理、提高效率,从而降低上网电价,又要考虑到电力改革的市场风险与平稳过渡。运用博弈论、微观经济学、电力市场理论的相关部分分析了在发电侧电力市场的现货市场中,各发电厂商面对两种市场竞价模式的博弈行为。Under electricity market, power generators sale power in spot market. It is very important to find an efective and reasonable bidding model, which will not only motivate the generating enterprises to strengthen management and improve the efficiency, consequently decreasing the electricity price, but also bring the market risk and steady transition into consideration. Relevant parts of Game Theory, Microeconomics and Power Market Theory are used to analyze the gaming behaviors of the generating corporations when facing the two markets in the spot market of generation-oriented market.

关 键 词：现货市场 古诺竞争(cournot) 线性供应函数竞争(LSF) 博弈均衡分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TM7[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]