插入随机时延的高阶旁路攻击防御方法  

Resistant to Higher-order Side-channel Attack by Inserting Random Delay

作　　者：张涛[1] 范明钰[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,成都610054

出　　处：《计算机工程》2008年第16期162-164,共3页Computer Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60373109;60272091)

摘　　要：旁路攻击是一种新的密码分析方法,现有的密码算法仍然容易遭受高阶旁路攻击。分析旁路信息的泄露模型与高阶攻击模型,针对AES算法的安全实现,提出一种插入随机时延的高阶攻击防御方法。该方法通过插入随机的冗余指令,降低了内部运算与泄露信息之间的相关性,从而使统计攻击无法成功。通过仿真实验证实该方法能有效地防御高阶旁路攻击。Side-channel attack is a new cryptanalysis, and the current cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to higher-order side-channel attack. The leakage model and adversary model are introduced, a new countermeasure based on inserting random delay is proposed to secure AES against higher-order side-channel attack. By inserting a redundant instruction, it is expected to reduce the correlation between the leakage and the inside operations, and thus make the statistic analysis infeasible. Simulation verifies the efficiency of the proposed method.

关 键 词：密码芯片 高阶旁路攻击 AES算法 随机时延 能量攻击 

分 类 号：TP301.6[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]