神经科学与宗教经验:约翰·希克关于宗教经验之合法性的辩护  

Neuroscience and Religious Experience:John Hick's Defence for the Rationality of Religious Experience

作　　者：王志成[1] 朱彩虹[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学外国哲学研究所,杭州310028

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2008年第8期78-83,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科项目"当代宗教多元论思潮的研究"(批准号:07BZJ002)的阶段性成果;浙江大学基督教与跨文化研究中心项目成果

摘　　要：约翰.希克站在宗教的立场上考察了神经科学对宗教经验提出的种种挑战,指出这些挑战本身存在的问题。他承认宗教经验与神经活动之间的确存在关联,但否认两者等同。进而,他转向神经科学的自然主义预设,论证心/脑同一理论和机械行为说都是站不住脚的。在此基础上,他主张自由意志,认为宗教经验有可能是经验者对超越者的敞开。Standing on a religious point of view, John Hick has investigated various challenges to religious experience imposed by researches of neuroscience. He finds out that these challenges are themselves questionable, and points out the difficulties they are confronted. Hick admits there are correlations between religious experience and neural activity. But they are not the same. Furthermore, he turns to naturalistic worldview, the presupposition of neuroscience. He argues that both mind/brain identity and epiphenomenalism are implausible. Therefore, there does exist non-physical reality. Based on this, he claims free will, which leaves open the possibility of religious experience being response to the real.

关 键 词：宗教经验 神经活动 心/脑同一理论 机械行为说 自由意志 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]