开发区“圈地热”的博弈模型解释  

Interpretation of Game Model of "Enclosure Craze" in Development Zones

作　　者：黄琦[1] 洪建国[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中农业大学土地管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《国土资源科技管理》2008年第4期91-95,共5页Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources

摘　　要：从博弈理论的角度,将中央政府与地方政府作为博弈双方,对开发区"圈地"的过程进行描述,并对出现的开发区"圈地热"结果进行博弈角度的解释。为使开发区土地利用整体处于合理水平,中央政府应加大对开发区用地的监察力度及对违法"圈地"的惩罚力度,以提高地方政府的"圈地"成本。In the process of China＇s urbanization, the movement of ＂enclosure craze＂ in the development zones has become one of the difficulties in land use management. This paper describes the process of ＂enclosure craze＂ in the development zones from the perspective of game theory and explains the result of ＂enclosure craze＂, concluding that to maintain the reasonable level of the overall land use in development zones, the central government should enhance its supervision of the land use in the development zones and enforce greater punishment for illegal ＂enclosure＂ and increase local government＇s cost in ＂enclosure＂.

关 键 词：圈地 博弈模型 中央政府 地方政府 开发区 

分 类 号：F301.24[经济管理—产业经济]