我国上市公司股权激励问题探析  

An Analysis on the Equity Incentive of Listed Companies in China

作　　者：黄济外[1] 

机构地区：[1]闽江学院管理学系,福建福州350108

出　　处：《闽江学院学报》2008年第4期33-39,共7页Journal of Minjiang University

基　　金：闽江学院社科育苗项目(YSY07001)

摘　　要：上市公司的股权激励在我国尚处于起步阶段,实践中新问题、新情况不断涌现。为了提高股权激励的有效性,以委托代理理论、人力资本理论、交易费用理论、博弈论和机制设计理论为理论基础进行分析,上市公司在实践中股权激励存在的主要问题是激励条件较低、激励成本较高、激励对象行权风险较大等,建议从完善公司治理结构、完善相关配套法规、建设上市公司经理人才市场、提高资本市场的有效性、加强对股权激励的监管等几个方面完善上市公司股权激励机制。The equity incentive of listed companies is still at the starting stage, and new problems and new situations have been emerging. In order to improve the validity of equity incentive, based on the principal-agent theory, the human capital theory, the transaction cost theory, the game theory and the mechanism design theory, the paper concludes that the major problems of listed companies in practicing the equity incentive are low incentive conditions, high incentive cost and high excising risk of incentive targets, and thus proposes that the equity incentive of listed companies should be perfected by improving the company governance structure and the relevant auxiliary law and regulations, constructing the manager market of listed companies, raising the effectiveness of capital markets and strengthening supervision over the equity incentive.

关 键 词：上市公司 股权激励 行权风险 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]