利益外部性和BOT模式的有效性  

Payoff Externality and Effectiveness of BOT Scheme

作　　者：石磊[1] 王东波[1] 戴大双[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2008年第4期120-126,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572097)

摘　　要：指出存在于基础设施项目中的利益外部性和隐蔽检查行为导致私营企业道德风险的发生,通过导入赏罚规定和完全竞争招标制度分析BOT模式的有效性。利益外部性表现为私营企业在项目施工期的所投入的努力水准影响项目经营期的费用。在传统模式中,施工公司不承担经营费用,赏罚规定和完全竞争招标不能抑制道德风险的发生。在禁止项目公司中途毁约的前提下,BOT模式使利益外部性内部化,从而避免项目公司的道德风险行为的发生。然而,由于项目公司是有限责任公司,在有限追索权原则下存在项目公司中途毁约的可能性,从而影响BOT模式的有效性。在这种情况下通过引入保证金制度可以有效地抑制道德风险,从而实现BOT模式的社会效率性。This paper examines the moral hazard issues arising-from the pay-off externalities and the private monitoring in infrastructure projects, and also investigates the effectiveness of BOT project by introducing penalty clauses and competitive tendering. The payoff externality refers to a situation that the level of effort exerted by the private sector in the construction period influences the cost occurring in the operation period. The moral hazard can not be deterred by the penalty clauses and competitive tendering, if the project is carried out by the traditional scheme. On the other hand, the moral hazard can be efficiently deterred by the BOT concession contract with a single agent internalizing the pay-off externality, as far as the project company is forbidden to quit from the contract throughout the contract periods. However, the efficiency of the BOT scheme is flawed if the breach of the contract can be made by the limited-liability company under limited recourse principle. The paper is concluded by the remark that the social efficiency is accomplished by applying deposit system which is valid to deter the moral hazard.

关 键 词：利益外部性 道德风险 传统模式 BOT模式 有效性 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]