自愿中报审计能减少盈余管理吗?——基于自选择模型的实证分析  

Can Voluntary Interim Auditing Reduce Earnings Management?——An empirical test of a self-selection model

作　　者：陈欣[1] 胡奕明[1] 王静[1] 马玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2008年第4期34-43,共10页Auditing Research

基　　金：上海市浦江人才计划(2006);国家留学基金委资助

摘　　要：中国上市公司除特殊情况外可以自愿选择是否进行中报审计。本文使用2001—2005年自愿选择进行中报审计的445家 A 股上市公司和其配对样本公司的数据,研究了公司进行中期报告审计的决定因素和中报审计对盈余管理的影响。我们发现,公司的 ROE、财务杠杆以及会计师事务所是否前"十大"对中报审计的购买有显著影响。考虑到中报审计可能是上市公司自选择的结果,我们进一步采用 Heckman 的两阶段模型方法来控制中报审计决定的内生性。研究发现,尽管自愿审计公司的中报显示更低的非正常应计利润,但没有证据表明这是由于审计造成的,模型估计结果表明,具有较高盈余质量的公司更倾向于进行中报审计。Except of special circumstances, Chinese listed firms may voluntarily have their semi-annual reported audited. Using financial data of 445 voluntary-auditing firms and their matching firms from year 2001 to 2005, this paper explores the determinants of voluntary auditing decisions by Chinese listed firms and the impact of such auditing on earnings management. We find that ROE, leverage and ＂The big-ten auditor＂ significantly influence the decision of voluntary interim auditing. Realizing that interim auditing is a self-selection decision, we empirically test a Heckman （1979） two-stage model to define interim auditing as an endogenous variable. Although we find significant lower earning management level for interim auditing sample firms, evidence indicates that firms with high earnings quality choose to have their interim reports audited. There is no evidence supporting that interim auditing can reduce earnings management.

关 键 词：中报审计 盈余管理 自愿审计 盈余质量 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F239.4