地方政府竞争、征税成本与金融资产质量  

Local Government Competition,Taxation Cost and Financial Assets Quality

作　　者：钟子明[1] 张宗益[1] 吴江[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2008年第3期64-68,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文从理论和实证两方面探讨了在地方政府竞争背景下,地方政府征税成本对货币发行与地区金融资产质量的影响。本文的研究发现由于从金融部门获取金融资源这一外部性很强的方式成为地方政府间竞争的重要手段,其后果将使地方政府特别是难以获得充足税收收入的地方政府更倾向于通过干预金融部门为公共投资融资,这构成了引起地方金融资产质量下降,金融生态环境难以改善的重要制度性原因。本文认为只有继续深化金融改革,提高金融部门独立性,并且使地方政府财权和事权相适应,才可能正确引导地方政府积极性,使地方财政和金融两方面都步入良性循环的轨道。In 1998, china began a profound reform of state owned banks, the target of the reform is to tighten budget constrain and solve the NPL problem. Under the framework of local government competition and government soft budget constrain, When the local government can intervene into the banking system and channel financial resources to support it＇ s competition with other local government, it will distort the macroeconomic policy and leave the NPL problem of banking system still to open. In this paper, we investigate theoretically and empirically the relationship between regional taxation cost and regional financial assets quality of china. We found strong correlation between them, which suggests further financial and taxation institution reform are needed to improve the financial environment and smooth the excess fluctuation of macroeconomic performance.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 财政分权 金融资产质量 时间一致性 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]