轮流出价博弈在制定大用户直供电价中的应用  

Application of Bargain Game Theory in the Price of Direct Power Supply

作　　者：赵飞[1] 周渝慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学电气工程学院,北京100044

出　　处：《电力系统及其自动化学报》2008年第4期77-81,共5页Proceedings of the CSU-EPSA

摘　　要：针对我国电力市场中大用户直供的研究现状,提出了从方法论上研究大用户直供的必要性。文中介绍了轮流出价的讨价还价博弈理论,并引出其中鲁宾斯坦(Rubinstein)模型;在双边垄断的电力市场与自由竞争的电力市场两种背景下,结合鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型,分析了电力直供中独立发电企业与大用户为确定直供电价与直供电量而进行的博弈过程;认为,轮流出价博弈理论可以很好地协调电力直供中独立发电企业与大用户之间的竞争与合作关系,并最终得出双方都满意的均衡直供电价。This paper presents a quantitative method on the price of direct power supply by methodology. Firstly, the bargain game theory and Rubinstein model are introduced. Furthermore, with the Rubinstein model the bidding process between independent power enterprise and large customer for the price and amount of direct power supply in the bilateral monopolization and perfect competitive power market is analyzed. At last ,the authors give a conclusion that the bargain game theory can be used to coordinate the relationship of competition and cooperation between the independent power enterprise and large customer ,and the satisfied price of direct power supply by both sides can be made.

关 键 词：电力大用户直供 轮流出价博弈 鲁宾斯坦模型 双边垄断市场 自由竞争市场 

分 类 号：TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F407.6[经济管理—产业经济]