流域间跨区污染的治理博弈分析——以陕南秦巴山南水北调中线工程水源涵养地为例  

Analysis on Control of Cross-valley Contamination by Game Theory——A Case Study on Watershed Area Pollution Control in Mid-part of the South-to-North Water Leading Project in Qinba Mountain Area,South Shaanxi Province

作　　者：张建肖[1] 刘世伟[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710027 [2]西北工业大学软件学院,陕西西安710065

出　　处：《西南林学院学报》2008年第4期126-128,141,共4页Journal of Southwest Forestry College

基　　金：陕西省教育厅人文社会科学专项科研计划项目资助(07JK137);陕西省软科学项目资助(2007KR29)

摘　　要：运用最优化原理,从效用角度出发,挖掘蕴藏于公共物品私人供给的资源配置理论,得出整体最优化要求提供的公共物品大于纳什均衡的公共物品供给,即要求秦巴山区在两地区共同决策情况下比独立决策提供更多的水源供给,该地区在水污染治理方面需付出更多的削减努力;从成本角度出发,以成本最小化为目标,分析合作博弈和非合作博弈两种情况下的不同结果,得出合作博弈将使两地区整体福利最大化,但同时也要求秦巴山区付出更多的努力.Base on optimization theory, effectiveness standpoint, and the resource disposition theory to explore the private supply kept inside the public goods, it was proposed that the provision of public goods （ as Qinba Mountainous area water supply project here） supplied according to integral optimization was greater than the balanced supply of public goods by Nash equilibrium theory, i. e. , it was meant that the water quantity provided by joint decision-making of Qin and Ba mountainous areas was greater than that of provided by individual decision making, It was indicated that more efforts should be made to reduce water pollution. Similarly, the result out of joint game was different from the independent game based on the minimized cost target, it was proposed that the joint game would optimize the overall welfare in the two corresponding mountainous areas.

关 键 词：流域间跨区污染 南水北调中线工程 博弈论 

分 类 号：X522[环境科学与工程—环境工程]