基于公司治理视角的上市公司经营者监督实证研究  

Empirical Study on Monitoring the Manager of Listed Company from the Perspective of Corporate Governance

作　　者：吕峻[1] 李朝霞[1] 胡洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所

出　　处：《数量经济技术经济研究》2008年第9期101-116,共16页Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文以2004～2006年非金融类上市公司为总体样本,采用非平衡面板数据模型实证研究了股东监督、董事会监督、债权监督的各种监督机制对于降低公司代理成本和增加公司绩效的有效性。实证结果发现:各种监督机制均有一定的效果,但从稳健的角度看,不存在对于所有类型公司均发挥作用的完全相同的监督方式。在中国现有经济和法制背景下,大股东的监督相对于其他监督机制来说具有更好的监督效果;独立董事的监督效果仅对国有公司存在一定的显著性,董事持股激励仅对非国有公司是显著的;债权监督效果对于直接代理成本显著存在,而对于间接代理成本和公司绩效不存在。This article examines the effectiveness of monitoring mechanism of shareholders, board and creditors on agent cost and performance. In order to study the question, the authors choose non -financial listed companies in the year of 2004 to 2006 as sampled population, adopt unbalanced panel data models as the tool of econometric analysis. The empirical findings show each monitoring mechanism has more or less effects to some extent. But from the perspective of robustness, there is no type of monitoring mechanism which has significant effect on all types of companies. In the background of Chinese present economic and legal system, big shareholders monitoring has better effectiveness compared to the other monitoring mechanisms, the effectiveness of independent directors monitoring exists only in state controlled companies, incentive effectiveness of director holding shares exists only in non-state controlled companies. Creditors monitoring has effect only on direct agent cost.

关 键 词：公司治理 监督机制 代理成本 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]