基于激励相容的银行监管代理问题的机制探讨  

On Problem of Agent in Banking Supervision Mechanism Compatible with Incentive

作　　者：丁琳琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学研究生院,大连116025

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2008年第5期18-22,31,共6页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

摘　　要：随着金融全球化进程的加快,金融风险变得更加复杂,我国银行业改革已经到了关键时期,因此,对银行的监管研究也显得尤为重要。根据激励监管理论将银行监管问题置于信息不对称的委托—代理分析框架内,分析了银行监管中外部的"代理人问题";针对我国银行监管中存在的监管机构缺乏明确分工、市场力量发挥作用有限、监管行政力量突出等委托代理问题,提出了在监管者与银行、存款人与监管当局之间应设计激励相容的监管机制,以促进银行业的健康发展的建议,并对激励相容的银行监管机制的建立提供了相应的对策。With the globalization of finance, financial risks are becoming more and more complicated. The reform of banks is stepping into a crucial stage in China. Therefore, it＇ s necessary to make a study of banking supervision. According to the theory of supervision compatible with incentive, the paper analyzes the problems of banking supervision and agent within the framework of agency by agreement with asymnmtric information. There exist some problems of agency by agreement in banking supervision in China such as the lack of clear division of responsibilities among supervision bodies, the limitation of market force, too much administrative supervision and so on. The paper thinks that it＇ s necessary to design the supervision mechanism compatible with incentive between supervisors and banks, and between depositors and supervisors to promote the sound development of banking. Finally, it offers some proposals for the establishment of banking supervision mechanism compatible with incentive.

关 键 词：银行监管 委托代理 激励相容 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]