风险投资中的报酬激励问题——基于双重委托代理模型的分析  

Toward the Compensation Incentive in Venture Capital:Based on Multi-Principal Agency Model

作　　者：蒋海[1,2] 李赟宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融研究所,广东广州510632 [2]暨南大学金融系

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2008年第5期118-122,共5页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：广东省社科基金(编号07E04);教育部留学回国人员启动基金的阶段性成果

摘　　要：风险投资入、风险资本家与风险企业家之间存在严重的信息不对称和多重委托代理关系,使得风险投资中的代理问题较一般企业更加复杂。如何通过机制设计形成风险投资中的激励形容机制,防止严重的道德风险,对风险投资业持续健康发展具有特殊重要的意义。本文运用双重委托代理模型,分析了风险资本家和风险企业家在信息不对称和线性支付契约下的最优努力水平和最优报酬支付比例问题。研究表明,报酬支付比例对风险资本家和风险企业家的激励及风险投资绩效产生重要影响。其中风险资本家和风险企业家的最优报酬支付比例与风险企业家的产出呈正向变动关系,但与他们的保留效用无关。Moral hazard is highlighted in the process of venture capital due to serious asymmetric informa- tion and multi-principal agent relationships among venture investor,venture capitalist and venture entrepre- neur.So the agency problem in venture capital is more complicated than that in general business.Therefore how to form incentive compatible mechanism via sound institutional design is a crucial issue for preventing mor- al hazard and for sustainable development of venture capital.Using multi-principal-agent model,our paper ana- lyzes the optimal ratios of compensation and the equilibrium efforts of venture capitalist and venture entrepre- neur under the linear contract.We find that the compensation ratios of investor and venture capitalist have sig- nificant impact on the performance of venture capital through exerting influence on their incentives.

关 键 词：风险投资 双重委托代理模型 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]