期权式合约、可置信承诺与订单农业的自我履约机制  

Option contract,credible commitment and the self-enforcing mechanism in order agriculture

作　　者：陈英武[1] 高彦彦[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2008年第10期80-86,共7页Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(05JJD790083);国家社会科学基金重大项目(05&ZD033);江苏省社科基金项目(06JSBJL002)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文把期权式合约的思想引进订单农业,分析订单农业的自我履约机制。期权式合约可以使农户的收益"下有保底、上不封顶",从而有效地降低农户的违约风险。但是这种绩效的前提是企业做出的承诺必须是可置信的。通过向农户进行专用性投资,企业可以显著地提高自身承诺的可置信程度,从而建立"互相锁定"的关系,促进签约双方形成有效的自我履约机制。This paper introduces option contract into order agriculture to analyze its self- enforced mechanisms. The option contract can protect peasants＇ interests, for the peasants get a guaranteed gain when the product price decreases and an increasing gains when product price, rises. So this contract can reduce effectively the risk of breaking contract by peasants. However, its premise is that the enterprise must make a credible commitment which can be enhanced by the enterprise＇ s specific investments to the peasants, so that interlocked relation is constructed between both sides, and the option contract can be effectively self- enforced.

关 键 词：订单农业 期权式合约 可置信承诺 

分 类 号：F323.5[经济管理—产业经济] F224