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作 者:尚宇梅[1]
机构地区:[1]西安财经学院建筑经济管理系,陕西西安710061
出 处:《建筑经济》2008年第10期46-48,共3页Construction Economy
基 金:陕西省社会科学界2008年重大理论和现实问题研究项目(08Z031);西安社会科学规划课题(07j23)
摘 要:由于局部利益的诱惑,在经济适用房政策实施中购房者、开发企业、地方政府和中央政府四方作为理性人都将以对方的行为预期作为自己行为的出发点进行博弈。通过博弈模型的建立,对各方主体之间的博弈进行分析,得出地方政府不会主动地、积极地开发经济适用房,中央政府在经济适用房建设中应明确地方政府的职责,制定政策鼓励房地产开发商建设经济适用房,尽快完善住房档案信息系统和建立个人收入信息系统等才能使地方政府积极主动地实施经济适用房政策。Because of the temptation of partial benefits during the implementation of affordable housing policies, as a rational person, buyer, developer, the local government and the central government will gaming regarding other's behavior expectation as own starting points. Through the establishment of game model, analyses the game between them. The results show that there is no motivation for the local government to develop affordable housing initiatively, therefore, in the construction of affordable housing, the central government should clear the responsibilities of the local government, make policies to encourage real estate developer to build affordable housing, perfect the house file information system and personal income information system as soon as possible to simulate the local governmentsj positivity.
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