可控提前期供应链库存优化的信用期机制研究  

Research on Credit Period Mechanism for optimizing Supply Chain Inventory with Controllable Lead Time

作　　者：李怡娜[1] 徐学军[1] 叶飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2008年第5期29-35,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(06003);广东省自然科学基金(05006576;06025804);广东省软科学项目(2006B70101014;2007B07090031)

摘　　要：在一个固定订货间隔期模型中,假设提前期可以通过额外的赶工成本进行压缩和卖方提供一定的信用期期限给买方的情况下,建立了可控提前期供应链库存优化的信用期机制模型。首先考虑买卖双方不合作情况下的Stackelberg主从对策博弈模型,求出买方最佳的订货周期、提前期和卖方的最优信用期期限决策,然后考虑买卖双方合作情况下的最优订货周期、提前期和信用期决策。最后利用数值分析对两类模型的优化效果进行比较,结果表明合作情况下买卖双方的收益均比不合作情况下有所改进。On the periodic review model, under the hypotheses that lead time can be controllable with crashing cost and supplier offers credit period to buyer, the credit period mechanism to optimizing supply chain inventory with controllable lead time is proposed in the paper. The Stackelberg model without cooperation is first considered. Buyer＇s optimal ordering cycle, ordering lead time and supplier＇ s optimal credit period are obtained. Then the optimal ordering cycle, lead time and credit period with cooperation are also obtained. At last, the optimization effects of the two models are compared by numerical analysis. The result shows that the benefits of supplier and buyer with cooperation are better than that of Stackelberg model.

关 键 词：可控提前期 信用期 供应链 优化 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]