不对称信息下逆向供应链激励合同研究  

Incentive contract in reverse supply chain with asymmetric information

作　　者：包晓英[1] 蒲云[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2008年第9期1717-1720,1732,共5页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

摘　　要：一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链中,产品的回收量依赖于零售商的回收努力。由于信息不对称的存在,制造商无法观测到零售商的回收努力行为,这样就会产生败德行为,影响逆供应链的协调。对此,利用委托代理分析框架,研究了逆供应链中制造商和零售商之间的利益博弈;分析了信息对称情况下,不同参数对回收努力的影响;并采用特例对非对称情况下保证线性契约机制有效的参数条件进行了分析。In the context of a single-manufacturer and single retailer reverse supply chain, the product returns efficiency depended on retailer＇s collection effort. However, due to asymmetric information, the manufacturer couldn＇t observe the retailers＇ endeavours, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of the whole reverse supply chain. To deal with this problem, the game between manufacturer and retailer was studied from the point of principal agency theory. Under symmetric information, different parameters＇ effects on the collection effort level of the retailer were analyzed. And under asymmetric information, the parameters terms to ensure the validity of linear contract were discussed through a special case.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 再制造 合同 信息不对称 回收努力 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]