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机构地区:[1]中央党校研究生院,北京100091 [2]重庆教育学院,重庆400071
出 处:《农业经济问题》2008年第10期46-50,共5页Issues in Agricultural Economy
摘 要:农村集体经济组织及其成员权和农村社区组织及其成员权虽然在实践、立法和理论研究中被混同了,但它们在历史渊源、权利内容、变迁趋势等方面都有本质的区别。两种不同组织和成员权的混同,在"正义"和"效率"两个纬度上产生的负面影响可以看作是现行农地制度的成本。混同的表面动因是为了农民的利益、节约组织治理和组织管理的交易费用,但深层动因却是国家通过其最底层的代理人——农村社区组织对农民的土地所有权进行控制,从而获得制度收益。通过成本和收益两个方面的法经济学分析,可知混同两种不同组织和成员权的制度安排的绩效是值得怀疑的。It is different between the member right of the Rural Collective Economic organizations and the rural community member right in such aspects as history origins,contents and changing tendency.However,they are confused in practice,laws and academic research.The institutional arrangements about confusion of two kinds of member rights produce negative outcomes in both two justice and efficient dimensions that can be thought as institutional costs of the current land tenure system.The superficial motivation for farmers' interests is in order to save the transaction cost of organization governance and management.But,the real motivation for the state and its deputies' interests(the village-level community organizations and their functionaries)is in order to control land tenure that should belong to farmers otherwise.By synthetically analysis on cost and benefit in law-economics,we can say the institutional efficiency is dubious.
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