物流服务水平影响市场需求变化的TPL协调合同  

Third party logistics coordinating contracts with logistics service dependent market demand

作　　者：吴庆[1] 但斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2008年第5期64-75,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家863计划资助项目(2007AA040801);国家社会科学基金资助项目(06XJY020);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-05-0769)

摘　　要：针对 TPL 服务提供商努力提高物流服务水平可以显著影响市场对客户企业产品需求的情形,运用动态博弈模型研究了这一情形下的协调合同设计问题.博弈模型表明常见的物流合同不能有效的协调 TPL 服务提供商和客户企业的决策行动.为了解决这一问题,设计了一种服务成本共担合同和一种收入共享与服务成本共担的组合式合同.前一种合同只能协调 TPL服务提供商的物流服务水平的决策;而后一种合同既可以协调 TPL 服务提供商的物流服务水平的决策,又能协调客户企业的存货决策,并且能实现双方的共赢.最后,给出了相应的算例.Since the improvement of logistics service levels caused by the efforts of a risk-neutral third party logistics service provider can significantly affect the market demand for the products of a risk-neutral client en- terprise, a dynamic game-theory model is developed to solve the coordinating contract design problem in this condition. A common logistics contract cannot effectively coordinate the decisions between the third party logistics service provider and its client enterprise. To resolve the problem, a service cost sharing contract and a combination contract with revenue sharing and service cost sharing are designed. The former contract can only coordinate the levels of logistics service provided by the third party. However, the latter contract can coordi- nate not only the logistics service levels that the third party providers but also the inventories that the client enterprise chooses, and it can achieve a win-win outcome. Finally, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the conclusions.

关 键 词：第三方物流 外包 博弈 协调 收入共享 服务成本共享 合同设计 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]