第一大股东持股对资本结构选择的影响研究  

Study on the Largest Shareholder's Effect on Choice of Capital Structure

作　　者：谢军[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《上海金融学院学报》2008年第2期31-38,共8页Journal of Shanhai Finance University

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金项目"投资者保护的区域研究"(5300372)

摘　　要：本文调查了上海证券交易所A股非金融业上市公司(2003-2005数据),从风险分散化的角度考察了股权结构(第一大股东持股)对资本结构(公司负债)的制度影响。作者发现,第一大股东持股对公司资产负债率均具有显示的负向影响;即使在控制了公司其他主要特征(资产规模、资产结构、盈利能力和市场价值)的影响之后,第一大股东持股对公司负债的负向效应仍然显著。这意味着,第一大股东持股越高,他们减少公司财务杠杆的动机就越强。该经验结果支持了本文风险分散化的理论预期:第一大股东具有显著的通过降低公司负债回避风险的融资倾向和管理动机。作者还观察到,作为法人(或非国有股东)的第一大股东比作为国有股东的第一大股东具有更强烈的动机降低公司债务。这一发现为风险分散化的理论解释提供了进一步的经验证据。本文的研究表明,股权集中化的公司可能会偏离最优财务决策的轨道。This paper investigates A-share non-financial public corporation listing in SHSE and takes a crosssection analysis based on 2003-2005 data. The paper investigates the ownership structure＇s systematical effect on capital structure from the perspective of risk diversification. Empirical research shows that the largest shareholding and ownership concentration have significant negative impact on corporate liability even after capital scale, capital structure, profitability and market value have been controlled. This means the more shares the largest shareholder has, the more it would like to decrease the function of corporate financial leverage. This empirical result also supports this paper＇s theoretical expectation of risk diversification： The largest shareholder has strong attempt to finance and manage by avoiding risk through decreasing corporate liability. The author observes that the largest shareholder, as the owner of the enterprise, （or private shareholder） has the stronger motivation to decrease corporate liability. The paper believes that shareholding concentration can make a company deviate optimal finance principle.

关 键 词：第一大股东 资本结构 公司负债 风险分散化 

分 类 号：F421.36[经济管理—产业经济]