独立董事能否防范上市公司合谋:一项基于上市公司的经验证据  

Independent Directors of Listed Companies Can Guard against Collusion or Not——An Empirical Evidence of Listed Company

作　　者：闫邹先[1] 孙玉梅 

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学实验学院,北京101101 [2]山东省德州市人事局,山东德州253016

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2008年第10期81-85,共5页Contemporary Economic Management

摘　　要：独立董事能否防范上市公司合谋,一直是一个有争议的话题。文章通过对我国78家受证监会公开处罚的制造业上市公司的实证分析,发现:独立董事获得报酬不能够抑制上市公司的合谋行为;独立董事人数与上市公司合谋行为之间没有明显的差异;独立董事的学历与上市公司合谋行为之间存在着正相关关系。为了抑制上市公司的合谋行为,保持其独立性,建议:禁止独立董事从上市公司那里获得报酬;在聘请专业人才作为独立董事方面,应该聘请一些既有专业技能又有时间保证的专业人才,并不是学历越高越好。It is still a controversial topic whether independent directors of listed companies can prevent collusion or not. Based on 78 penalized manufacturing listed companies by the SFC, it is found that： independent directors who get money are not possible to ban the listed company＇ s collusive behaviors; the number of independent directors of listed company＇ s collusion behavior have no obvious difference; the qualifications of independent directors have positive correlation to listed company＇ s collusion behaviors . In order to curb the collusion of listed companies, and to maintain their independence, we must ban the independent directors to obtain compensation from listed compa- nies; employment professionals as independent directors, we need to hire someone who have professional skills and time to prevent collusion. The more justification doesn＇ t mean the better ability.

关 键 词：独立董事 上市公司合谋 实证研究 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]