法律权威与行动理由——基于拉兹实践哲学进路的考察  

Legal Authority and Reason for Action:A Study Based on Practical Philosophy Approach of Raz

作　　者：朱振[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学理论法学研究中心,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《法制与社会发展》2008年第6期100-108,共9页Law and Social Development

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"法律的权威性:基于实践哲学的研究"(08CFX003)

摘　　要：权威可以分为理论权威与实践权威、事实权威与合法权威,拉兹讨论的是合法的实践权威。权力与承认这两个概念都无法有效地界定合法的实践权威,在一定意义上可以说,拉兹的实践权威理论批判性地借鉴了权力论的分析模式并用行动理由作为基本分析概念。法律主张合法权威是法律的一个本质特征,法律规范也是一种强制性的行动理由,即一种内容独立的排他性理由。Authority could be categorized as theoretical authority and practical authority, de facto authority and de jure authority, among which Raz discussed de jure practical authority. Power and recognition could not effectively define such authority. It could be concluded that Raz＇ theory made use of the analytical mode of power theory and employed reason for action as basic analytical concept. To claim legal authority is a basic character of law, and legal rules are compulsive reason for action in the way that it is independent in content and exclusive.

关 键 词：理由 权威 实践推理 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]