“钓鱼工程”的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Angling Engineering Projects

作　　者：赵瑞[1,2] 申金山[2] 刘晓君[1] 胡继勇 

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学,陕西西安710055 [2]郑州航空工业管理学院,河南郑州450015 [3]河南省建筑科学研究院有限公司,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《建筑经济》2008年第11期56-59,共4页Construction Economy

摘　　要：引入博弈论方法,建立了完全信息动态博弈模型,对"钓鱼工程"建设单位和出资方的博弈过程进行了分析。结果表明:如果没有一定的惩罚机制的约束,本博弈惟一的子博弈纳什均衡就是{超概算,追加拨款},从而揭示了"钓鱼工程"和"三超"现象存在的经济根源。最后基于博弈分析,从四个方面提出相应的对策和建议。Game theory is introduced to analyze the strategies, payoffs and order between construction units and investors, the corresponding dynamic game model of perfect information is set up. The game results indicate that the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is {overrunning budget estimate, adding investment} without restrictions of punishing mechanisms. According to the game, it reveals the economic sources of angling engineering projects and three overruns. At last, based on further game analyses, countermeasures of preventing angling engineering projects are presented from four aspects.

关 键 词：钓鱼工程 动态博弈 超概算 沉没成本 对策 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]