企业IT系统应用决策的博弈分析及实证研究  

Enterprise IT Application Decisions Game Analysis and Empirical Study

作　　者：陈升[1] 赵泉午[2] 孟庆国[1] 胡鞍钢[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学国情研究中心,北京100084 [2]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2008年第5期182-192,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272043)

摘　　要：现有文献很少基于企业间的博弈来研究企业IT系统应用决策问题。本文首先构建博弈论模型证明了企业IT采用层次、实施投入水平分别为决策变量的情况下,两阶段博弈纯纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性,进而求出IT采用层次和预算同时决策变量条件下,n个企业三阶段博弈纯纳什均衡解,分析了纳什均衡状态时,企业初始因素、IT系统采用层次、实施投入水平及IT应用绩效之间的相互关系,同时以重庆市相关企业为样本的两阶段问卷数据,对理论分析的结果进行实证研究,结果表明:采用动因和实施投入水平显著正相关,实施投入水平与IT应用绩效显著正相关,采用层次与实施投入水平负相关,采用动因与应用绩效显著负相关。There are few papers to study IT application decisions based on game theory. This study proves existence and uniqueness of the pure-- strategic Nash Equilibrium of n firms＇ following three-- stage game： in the first stage, the enterprise decides IT adoption level Mi ; in the second Stage, the enterprise decides the level of resources allocated to IT implementation ki ; in the last stage, the enterprise decides its own product quantity qi , to participate in Cournot product quantity competition. Then at the state of Nash Equi- librium the relevant factors relationship is analyzed. The results show that ： the adoption motivation on the level of resources allocated to IT implementation, the level of resources allocated to IT implementation on IT application performance exist positive effect significantly ; the adoption level on the level of resources allocated to IT implementation, the adoption motivation on IT application performance exist nega- tive effect significantly.

关 键 词：纳什均衡 企业先天条件 采用层次 实施投入水平 IT应用绩效 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]