股票期权的法律与会计约束——伊利事件的启示  

Regulation on the Executive Stock Option:Interaction between Law and Accounting

作　　者：刘燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2008年第6期84-92,共9页Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学课题"上市公司财务运作的法律规制"(JA820001)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：经理人股票期权是当前最有争议的问题之一,凸显了管理层与股东之间利益冲突。由于理论上计量管理层贡献的困难,法律对此的回应是一种程序导向的控制方式。同时,会计准则通过股票期权费用化,对管理层形成间接约束。伊利股票期权事件表明,法律与会计的单独运作都难以对管理层自利行为构成有效约束。特别是,法律的程序导向不仅产生形式主义流弊,甚至以合法的名义消解了会计准则本可实现的间接约束。为此,有必要把法律与会计二者的控制功能有机结合起来,以实现对经理人股票期权的有效约束。This paper explore the way to regulation Executive Stock Option （ESO） through interaction of law and accounting. Due to the theoretical difficulty in measuring executives＇ contribution, the law used to response to the issue with a process-oriented control meehanisam. Besides, accounting play a role of indirect restrain by treating ESO as expense. The market practice, however, showed that neither law nor accounting could achieve the expectation when function independently. Moreover, the worst situation occur when the law, with its focusing on formality, was manipulated to erase the function accounting was supposed to have. Based on the ease study, the author draws the conclusion that the law and accounting shall interact closely in order to realize an effective regulation of ESO.

关 键 词：经营者期权 法律与会计互动 期权费用化 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]