上市公司会计信息披露管制的博弈分析及改进建议  

The Game Analysis on Accounting Disclosure Regulation of Listed Companies and Inspiring Suggestions for Improvement

作　　者：任秀梅[1] 苏文军[1] 生艳梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]大庆石油学院,大庆163318

出　　处：《黑龙江八一农垦大学学报》2008年第5期93-95,共3页journal of heilongjiang bayi agricultural university

基　　金：黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(11534010)

摘　　要：为规范和改善我国金融及股市环境,从博弈论模型的角度对监管者的检查及上市公司的舞弊进行了定量的分析,并得出如下结论:上市公司披露虚假会计信息的次数与监管者检查的次数成反比;加大对上市公司披露虚假会计信息的监管力度将会有效地减少虚假会计信息的披露;对上市公司披露虚假会计信息惩罚的最低值应为监管者的检查成本与上市公司舞弊概率的比值。In order to make criterion and improve the finance and stock market in our country, from the perspective of Game Theory Model, the inspection of supervisors and fraud of listed companies were analyzed quantitatively. The results as followed： The times of false accounting information that listed companies disclose were inversely proportional to those of supervisors＇ inspection. Definitely, to strengthen the supervision of accounting information disclosure was the efficient way to reduce fraud accounting information disclosure. The lowest value of punishing fraud accounting information of listed companies should be the ratio of supervisors＇ cost and fraud probability of listed companies.

关 键 词：会计信息披露 管制 博弈 

分 类 号：F231.6[经济管理—会计学]