中印能源关系的博弈分析  

An Analysis of Relations and Games in Energy Development between China and India

作　　者：伍福佐[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学国际问题研究院中国外交研究中心助理研究员 博士

出　　处：《南亚研究季刊》2008年第3期55-60,共6页South Asian Studies Quarterly

基　　金：复旦大学亚洲研究中心资助项目成果

摘　　要：中印两国自身的油气资源不能满足国内需求而不得不依赖海外油气资源。因此,两国政府都积极支持本国的国有石油公司"走出去",获得份额油气。在具体实践过程中,两国既竞争又合作。本文通过运用两阶段动态博弈模型分析研究显示,竞争与合作都是中印两国在寻求海外油气资产博弈中的子博弈完美纳什均衡的结果,这是两国根据成本—收益计算所采取行动的结果。Both China and India are not able to meet their domestic demand for oil and natural gas with their own home resources, and have to rely on those from abroad. Governments of both, therefore, encourage their home state-owned oil companies to 'go out' to take a share of oil and natural gas abroad. And the two neighbors, thus, have both competition and cooperation in their seeking for supply of such resources. This article tries to show us both competition and cooperation between the two countries as a result of the Sub-game Perfect NASH Equilibrium in their games to seek overseas oil and natural gas assets. That is also a result of an action taken by both countries on the basis of their cost-gain computation.

关 键 词：中国 印度 油气资产 “走出去” 博弈 均衡 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]