存款保险理论与中国的选择  

Deposit insurance theory and China′s choice

作　　者：李喜梅[1] 郭颂平[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院,广东广州510521

出　　处：《保险研究》2008年第11期70-75,共6页Insurance Studies

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划2007年度项目"(07E13);2007年广东省科技计划项目(2007B06040035);2006年广东省高校人文社科项目重点课题(06-D-79004)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：目前我国金融改革已经进入了一个新的阶段,存款保险制度的建立显得非常必要。本文结合存款保险理论,提出在存款保险成员资格上,可考虑由存款保险机构与政府协商一个可提供保险的存款类金融机构的最低条件,符合条件的要强制参加存款保险。要设计存款保险机构合理的融资来源,并建立一种金融危机准备基金。防范现行体制下实施存款保险制度可能引起的"道德风险"和"逆向选择"问题,并完善相关配套措施。China＇s financial reform has entered a new stage. It is very necessary to establish a deposit insurance system. Taking into account deposit insurance theories, this paper raised that in terms of deposit insurer＇s membership, we can have deposit insurance organizations and government authority to negotiate a feasible minimum standard for savings type of financial institutions to be insured. And it is mandatory for those who meet this standard to participate in deposit insurance. We should also design a rational financing source for deposit insurance institutions, and establish a financial crisis provisional fund. We should guard against possible ＂moral risks＂ and ＂adverse selection＂ that may be triggered off by the implementation of deposit insurance system, and enhance supporting measures.

关 键 词：存款保险 理论 应用 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]