投资辛迪加与融资市场中的道德风险  

Moral hazard of syndicate and financing market

作　　者：郑君君[1] 赵贵玉[1] 范文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]中国科学院武汉物理与数学所,武汉430071

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第11期23-28,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金(08JA630062)

摘　　要：通过运用委托-代理理论、博弈论建立模型来对有投资辛迪加参与下的风险投资融资市场中出现的道德风险问题进行定量化研究,以揭示其产生的原因及后果.研究结果表明,不仅风险企业家,而且辛迪加组织中的非领导风险投资家都会因事后投机行为而产生道德风险问题,从而使均衡结果无效.为解决道德风险发生的一种较为极端的情况即风险企业家可能会"拿钱后不付出任何努力"的情形,引入了信号传递博弈,从而使道德风险在某种程度上得以减轻.The former researches almost focused on the principal-agent relationship of venture capitalist, venture enterpriser and the moral hazard under this. This paper brings the term of syndicate into this frame analyzing dynamic game relation between venture enterpriser and syndicate. The research indicates that not only venture enterpriser but also non-lead venture capitalist of syndicate will have moral risk to make equilibrium outcome ineffective. In order to solve the problem in a radical situation that venture enterpriser may ＂make no efforts after getting money＂, the paper introduces signaling game, thus the moral hnTard can be minimized at a level.

关 键 词：投资辛迪加 纳什均衡 道德风险 信号传递博弈 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]