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机构地区:[1]湘潭大学旅游管理学院,中国湖南湘潭411105
出 处:《经济地理》2008年第6期1049-1052,共4页Economic Geography
摘 要:文章基于公共物品私人供给的模型,构建了新农村建设时期乡村红色文化遗产保护过程中村民在个体理性支配下同集体理性进行博弈的分析框架,并据此对实践中存在的保护政策失效和村民间保护意愿差异的现象进行了解析。结论认为,村民在个体理性支配下的博弈行为符合福利经济学基本理论,构成了保护政策失效的主要原因;为此,结合村民的行为特点和福利经济学的分析,引入了法律保护机制以探求思路和对策。This article based on the public goods personal suppliesmodel, constructed in the new rural reconstruction time village red cultural heritage protection process the villagers to carry on gambling in the individual rationality control similarly herein after collective rationality the analysis frame, and according to the above to practiced between the protection policy expiration and the villagers which existed the protection wish difference phenomenon has carried on the analysis. The conclusion believed that, villagers'conforms to the welfare economics elementary theory under individual rationality control gambling behavior, constituted the main reason which the protection policy expires; Therefore, this article unifies villagers' behavior chamcteristic and the welfare economics analysis,introduced the legal protection mechanism to seek the mentality and the countermeasure.
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