解决逻辑全能基本制约性标准及哲学反思  

Basic Conditionality Criterion in Alleviating the Logical Omniscience Problem

作　　者：陈晓华[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学哲学与历史文化学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2008年第6期154-157,共4页Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences

基　　金：湖南省社科基金项目"逻辑全能问题研究"(06ZC58);教育部重点研究基地重大项目"逻辑哲学重大问题研究"(05JJD720.40002)系列成果

摘　　要：逻辑全能问题是认知逻辑发展的一个瓶颈,抑制了认知逻辑在其他学科中的应用。许多学者对逻辑全能问题提出了诸多的解决方案,但并未在"解决标准"上展开深入研讨,难以在各种解决方案的优劣上达成共识。在达克提出的"逻辑全能"与"逻辑无能"概念的基础上,文章试图给出解决逻辑全能问题的一种基本制约性标准,并给予哲学说明。The logical omniscience problem is a choke point of epistemic logic, which restrains epistemic logic from being applied in other disciplines. A number of scholars have put forward many solutions for the logical omniscience problem, they haven＇ t carried on a deep discussion on its standard for solving it. So it is very difficult for them to have come to an agreement on which solution to it is better. Based on the concepts of logical omniscience and logical ignorance put forward by H. N. I）uc, this paper tries to present a basic conditionality standard to solve the logical omniscience problem and gives philosophical explanation to it.

关 键 词：逻辑全能 逻辑无能 弱矛盾信念 强矛盾信念 

分 类 号：B815.3[哲学宗教—逻辑学]