终极控制权结构下上市公司实际控制人治理行为  

Governance behaviors of listed firms' real controlling shareholders under ultimate control structures

作　　者：贾明[1] 张喆[2] 万迪[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2008年第12期1-18,共18页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70572039);西安交通大学“985工程”二期(07200701)

摘　　要：在终极控制权结构下以中国实践为背景,将控制权私人收益及声誉机制有机融合,以一个统一的模型分析框架研究实际控制人的侵占、监督和支持三种治理行为产生的条件和影响因素,指出终极所有权结构决定实际控制人治理行为进而影响企业绩效,从而弥补终极所有权结构与公司绩效之间跳跃的逻辑关系.The popularity of concentrated ultimate control rights and the deviation between ownership and control rights around the world show that the logical starting point of corporate governance studies changes to study on the conflict of interest between real controlling shareholders and investors. Under the background of China reality and ultimate ownership structure and integration the private benefits of control and reputation mechanism, building an unified framework to study on the conditions and influential factors of the real controlling shareholders＇ tunneling, monitoring and propping behaviors, this research points out that the ultimate ownerships determines the real controlling shareholders＇ behaviors and then affect corporate performance. Thus this research modifies the jump logic relatiouship between ultimate ownership structures and corporate performance.

关 键 词：现金流量权 控制权 侵占行为 监督行为 支持行为 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]