现金流、股权结构与中国上市公司投资行为  

Cash Flow, Ownership Structure and the Investment of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：王治[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114 [2]湖南大学经贸学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2008年第12期86-90,共5页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：长沙理工大学博士基金资助项目<基于委托代理理论的企业非效率投资行为研究>(1004161)

摘　　要：基于我国制度背景,利用上市公司财务数据,实证检验了股权结构、现金流对我国上市公司投资行为的影响。经验证据表明,当企业自由现金流较低时,非国有控股企业表现为投资不足,企业投资对内部现金流是敏感的,而国有控股企业投资对内部现金流不敏感;当企业自由现金流较高时,国有控股企业和非国有控股企业都表现为过度投资,两类企业投资对内部现金流都是敏感的。居中的股权结构能够抑制国有控股企业的过度投资问题,分散的股权结构和过于集中的股权结构则可能使企业的过度投资问题更为严重。此外,居中的股权结构既不能抑制非国有控股企业过度投资,又不能促进企业有效投资。Considering the system in China, we tested empirically the effect of ownership structure on the investment of listed company in China by using the financial data. The Empirical Evidence shows that underinvestment will occur in non-state-holding enterprises when the free cash flow is relatively low, the investment in these corporations is sensitive to internal cash flow, while in state-holding enterprises it is the other way round. When the free cash flow is relatively high, overinvestment will occur both in state-holding enterprises and non-stateholding enterprises and the investment in both are sensitive to internal cash flaw. The centered ownership structure could constrain overinvestment in state-holding enterprise, however, the separate and the overcentralized ownership structure may induce more frequent overinvestment in corporation. In addition, centered ownership structure neither constrains overinvestment nor promotes the effective investment in non-state-holding enterprises.

关 键 词：股权结构 内部现金流 投资不足 过度投资 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F830.59