不完全信息条件下基于产品质量的出口政策选择  

On the Choice of Product Quality based Export Policy with Imperfect Information

作　　者：陈虎[1] 

机构地区：[1]盐城师范学院商学院,江苏盐城224002

出　　处：《财贸研究》2008年第6期39-46,共8页Finance and Trade Research

摘　　要：在产品质量信息不完全性普遍存在的情况下,企业产品质量选择与国家产品质量声誉相互影响。提高国家产品质量声誉可以提高企业期望收益和国家福利,但由于产品质量外部性的存在以及国家产品质量声誉的"公共产品"性质,企业的自主产品质量选择行为并不会必然导致较高的国家产品质量声誉,从而存在国家干预的必要性。在一般情况下,实施"税收—补贴"组合政策是较优的政策选择。Product quality of an enterprise and a country＇s quality reputation affect each other, because production quality information is generally imperfect. The improvement of a nation＇s quality reputation will increase the exporters＇ expected revenue and the country＇s weffare. However, because of the externalities of product quality and the characteristics of public goods of quality reputation, non-intervention quality choices of exporters will not necessarily lead to a country＇s higher quality reputation, so the intervention from government is necessary, and a combined policy of tax-subsidy is superior in most cases.

关 键 词：不完全信息 产品质量 出口政策 出口退税 

分 类 号：F741.1[经济管理—国际贸易]