一种不完全信息相互威慑讨价还价模型  

A Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence With Incomplete Information

作　　者：向钢华[1] 王永县[2] 

机构地区：[1]第二炮兵指挥学院,湖北武汉430012 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2008年第6期16-19,共4页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：理性威慑理论将相互威慑看作是一种讨价还价过程,但鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价模型无法直接用于相互威慑讨价还价研究。本文将不完全信息引入相互威慑讨价还价之中,探讨了相互威慑中博弈方单边不完全信息和双边不完全信息条件下的威慑可信性与冲突可能性。In rational deterrence theory mutual deterrence is considered as a kind of bargaining process, but the classical Rubinstein bargaining model can not be directly applied to it. The paper proposes a mutual deterrence bargaining model with incomplete information, and analyzes the deterrence credibility and conflict possibility with incomplete information of one player and incomplete information of two players.

关 键 词：威慑 相互威慑 讨价还价 不完全信息 博弈论 

分 类 号：E817[军事—战略学]