双重违约风险下的银企共赢信用机理研究  

Study of Bank-enterprise Beneficial Credit Mechanism in Dual Default Risk

作　　者：王玥[1] 秦学志[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2008年第6期127-133,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771018);教育部人文社科基金项目(05JA630005);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(2005年)

摘　　要：本文以银企信贷关系为例,考虑主观和客观双重违约风险因素,在多渠道融资模式下得到信贷各方共赢博弈决策模型,并给出博弈均衡解。在此基础上,通过实证分析挖掘出双重信用风险影响下企业融资难问题的根源,给出解决方案。探索性地给出实现信贷系统共赢发展的有效策略集,并提出一定的政策建议。In this paper, we examine credit loan relation with dual factor in subjective and objective default risk, and multi-channel financial mode. Credit loan game model and corresponding financing decision are presented. On this basis, by empirical analysis the root cause of difficulty problem in enterprise＇ s financing processes and its solution are explored. The effective strategy sets for realization of a multi-beneficial credit loan system and some policy suggestions for this problem are proposed.

关 键 词：违约风险 共赢 博弈均衡 信用机理 信贷关系 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]