基于回收再制造的逆向供应链的契约研究  

A Study on Coordination Prompting Mechanism in Reverse Supply Chain With Product Remanufacturing

作　　者：唐元宁[1] 包晓英[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学物流学院,成都610031 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2008年第6期822-825,共4页World Sci-Tech R&D

摘　　要：废旧产品的回收依赖零售商努力且在产品回收量随机的情况下,研究批发价格契约、收入共享契约、回馈与惩罚契约以及两部收费制契约在该环境下的协调情况。结论表明,批发价格契约以及收入共享契约由于在收益划分上的唯一性,而不能有效协调逆供应链;回馈与惩罚契约则弥补了收入共享契约,两部收费制契约则弥补了批发价格契约在收益划分上的缺陷,能有效协调制造商和零售商的行为。最后,结合算例证明了回馈与惩罚契约以及"两部收费制"契约使渠道得到了Pareto改进。Based on retailer＇s effort dependent the product quantity of return, and the product quantity of return is stochastic,the coordination of the whole price contract, revenue sharing contract, rebate and penalty contract and two-part tariff contract coordinated the reverse supply chain were analyzed. It was proved that whole price contract and revenue sharing contract had the unicity of allocating the reverse supply chain profit and therefore could not coordinate reverse supply chain,rebate and penalty contract remedied the limitation of the whole contract and two-part tariff contract remedied the limitation of penalty contract, so they could coordinate the reverse supply chain effectively. A numerical example was presented to confirm the above conclusion.

关 键 词：再制造 逆向供应链 回收努力水平 协调机制 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济] F224