“上有政策,下有对策”现象的公共选择理论分析  

Analyzing the Phenomena that "the Subordinate Authority Does not Carry out Effectively the Policies According to the Request of Higher Government" Based on the Public Choice Theory

作　　者：阳敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学公共管理学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《合肥学院学报（社会科学版）》2009年第1期102-104,共3页Journal of Hefei University:Social Sciences

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学办公室"和谐社会构建中的地方政府政策执行力研究"(07BZZ018)基金项目资助

摘　　要："上有政策,下有对策"是我国公共政策执行中经常存在的一种不良现象,其不仅阻碍了政令通畅、危害政府职责的有效完成,而且妨碍了政府公信力的树立、损害了党和国家政策的权威性。用公共选择理论来分析"上有政策,下有对策"现象,就是要把经济学的假定和方法应用于公共政策的执行中,以地方政府的自利性为研究切入点,分析了该现象发生的原因,并提出了相应的防治措施,如合理加大利益整合,大力加强信息沟通以及积极完善监督落实。The phenomena that ＂the subordinate authority does not carry out effectively the policies ac- cording to the request of higher government＂ is usually existing in our country＇s public policy execu- tion. Studying how to prevent this phenomenon from happening is not only important to carry out the central policy effectively, but is also valuable to promote the local government＇s policy power. This ar- ticle uses the public choice theory to analyze this phenomenon. It puts the hypothesis and method of e- conomics into public policy execution and takes the self-interesting of local government as the research breakthrough point. It analyzes the reason of this phenomenon and gives the corresponding prevention measures： Enlarging the benefit conformity reasonably, strengthening the information communication and carrying out surveillance positively.

关 键 词：“上有政策 下有对策” 公共选择理论 中央政策 地方政府 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]