基于隐性激励的公共部门组织合谋防范机制设计研究  

Research on the Mechanism Design of Public Sector Collusion Based on Implicit Incentive Theory

作　　者：郭起宏[1] 李双燕[1] 万迪昉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2008年第5期94-97,共4页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70572039);西安交通大学“985工程”(07200701);深圳市城市管理局“信息技术应用对城市基础设施管理绩效的影响研究”课题

摘　　要：将隐性激励方式引入合谋理论研究,建立了公共部门组织的政府—监察者—执行单位间的三层委托代理模型,重点考察了声誉机制和监督强度对合谋合约结构的影响。研究结果表明,监察者和执行单位越关注自身声誉,子合同转移支付效率就越低,合谋越不容易发生;而外部监督强度越高,合谋被发现的概率越高,合谋越不容易发生。The paper introduced implicit incentives to collusion theory, constructed a government supervisor executor hierarchy agency model, and analyzed the impact of reputation level and supervision strength on collusion contract structure. The results suggested that the more the public departments concerned about their reputation, the lower the side-contract transfer payment efficiency, and then the more unlikely the collusion would happen. The higher the supervision strength, the higher possibility that collusion may be found, and then the more unlikely the collusion would happen. This correlation provides a new solution for how to prevent the happen of collusion in the field of public sector.

关 键 词：合谋 声誉 监督 公共部门 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]