SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT WITH MULTIPLE COMPETING RETAILERS  

多个分销商相互竞争下的供应链突变管理(英文)

作　　者：陈克兵[1] 肖条军[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学理学院 [2]南京大学工程管理学院

出　　处：《Transactions of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics》2008年第4期295-302,共8页南京航空航天大学学报（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the Scientific Research Foundation for Young Faulty of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics(S0670-082)~~

摘　　要：As for the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple competing retailers, the disruption management decision is considered for the demand disruption that both the investment sensitivity coefficient and the investment-elasticity are changed simultaneously. Meanwhile, the corresponding solutions are given for different cases of the disruption, and the characteristics of the solutions are analyzed. The production plan is proved to he robustness under certain conditions, and the production plan of the coordination strategy is investigated for the disruption with appropriate contractual arrangement, i. e. , a subside rate schedule. Mutual restraints exist between the changed investment sensitivity coefficient and the investment-elasticity when the coordination mecha- nism is used. And the more the number of the retailers in the system, the more the subside provided by the suppler on the coordinaton strategy.针对由一个供应商和多个分销商组成的供应链系统,考虑了市场需求发生突变,即投资敏感系数和市场需求的投资成本的弹性同时发生突变的情况下的应急管理决策。给出了相应的应急管理问题的可行解空间,并就每一种可能的突变定性分析了决策管理最优解的性质。结果证明了在一定条件下,原生产计划存在着鲁棒性。针对不同突变情形,研究了在供应商作为Stackelberg领导身份情况下的协调策略(补贴率契约)机制问题。同时诠释了在协调策略下,当系统中竞争的分销商增加时,供应商提供的补贴率也会随之增加的现象。

关 键 词：supply chain management ROBUSTNESS COORDINATION disruption management subside rate schedule 

分 类 号：O221[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.7[理学—数学]