试析烟草广告博弈的“囚徒困境”及政府立法的解围作用  

On "Prisoner's Dilemma"of Tobacco Advertisement Game and the Disembarrassing Function of Government Legislation

作　　者：郝峰[1] 王章豹[2] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学人文经济学院,合肥230009 [2]合肥工业大学教务处,合肥230009

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第1期89-92,共4页Journal of Hefei University of Technology(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：烟草广告是促进烟草消费的重要手段。文章从阐述"囚徒困境"的本质内涵入手,通过建立烟草广告竞争博弈模型,分析了现实烟草市场竞争中的博弈行为和烟草公司的"两难选择"困境,探讨了政府立法在帮助烟草公司逃离"囚徒困境"和打破非合作式"纳什均衡"中所起的重要作用,并指出政府只有加大管制和执法力度,才能达到禁止烟草广告的最终目的。Tobacco advertising is an important promotion means of tobacco consumption. Starting with the essential connotation on ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂, this article analyses the game behavior of the real tobacco market competition and the ＂dilemma＂ corner of the tobacco companies, through the establishment of tobacco advertising competition game model. The article also discusses the important role played by government legislation, on helping tobacco companies to flee the ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ and break the non-cooperative ＂Nash equilibrium＂. And the article points out that in order to ultimately achieve the purpose of ban on tobacco advertising, the government only have to increased control and law enforcement efforts.

关 键 词：烟草广告 囚徒困境 博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]