可转债双重属性对控制权利益影响的实证研究  

Empirical Study of the Effect of Double Property of Convertible Bond on Private Benefit Control

作　　者：牛玉科 

机构地区：[1]河北国有资产控股运营有限公司,河北石家庄050000

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2009年第1期93-96,共4页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

摘　　要：控制权利益虽然在配股和增发中发挥着重要的作用,但本文研究发现,可转债债券属性的潜在约束和转换期权的不确定性对控制权利益起一定的抑制作用,控制权利益在上市公司可转债融资中不起主导作用。可转债债券属性对控制利益的潜在约束作用明显,我国可以适度发展可转债融资来抑制资本市场上较普遍的控制权利益。Private benefit control plays a major role in dividing shares and issuing additional shares. However, the study in this article shows that the potential restriction of convertible bond feature and the uncertainty of convertible option restrain the private benefit control and the private benefit control does not play a dominant role in financing via convertible debts by listed companies. Since the property of convertible bonds has a distinct constraint on private bonefit control, China can properly use financing via convertible debts to inhibit the universal private benefit control on capital market.

关 键 词：可转债 控制权利益 债券性 期权性 

分 类 号：F830.46[经济管理—金融学]