论名称的涵义和指称  

On the Sense and Reference of the Name

作　　者：王健平[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学政治与行政学院,广州510631

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2009年第1期6-10,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划项目"指称问题研究"(08JA72040001);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"现代逻辑背景下的逻辑哲学研究"(07JJD720045)

摘　　要：密尔所提"达特茅斯"问题并不能证明专名有所指而无涵义。弗雷格指出名称是通过涵义指称对象的,但他的理论存在许多不足。罗素在区分专名与摹状词的前提下认为有涵义的是摹状词,而他所讲的摹状词的涵义与人们通常讲的名称的涵义并不相同。塞尔讲的专名在指称性使用中涉及到的摹状词与人们通常讲的名称的涵义基本一致,但是把专名的涵义看做是使用者预设的,显得缺乏充足理由。克里普克认为摹状词所描述的对象的特性属于对象而不属于名称,这其实并不影响摹状词可以成为名称的涵义。对于同一名称指称不同对象的情况,关键是要看人们是通过什么途径将这些名称区别开来的。在专名的零指称问题上,多数人是把名称所指的对象等同于现实世界中存在的个体。实际上,看一个名称有无指称应该主要看这个名称的使用语境。The issue of ＂Dartmouth＂ which Mill mentioned can＇t prove that the proper name is with the reference but without sense. Frege pointed out that the name refers to the objective by the sense, but his theory is insufficient. Under the premise of distinguishing Proper Name and Description, Russell believed that description has the sense. But the sense of descriptions that he said is different from the sense of the name which people usually say. The proper name referring to the description in referential use what Searl said is basically consistent with the sense of the name that the people usually say. But he regards the sense of the proper name as the user presupposition, obviously lack of the sufficient reasons. Kripke thought the character of the object that the description describes belongs to the object not the name. In fact, this does not affect the description to become the sense of name. Regarding the situation that the identical name refers to the different objects, it is significant to see by which way the people distinguish these names. On the question of proper name referring nothing, most people regard the object that the name refers to as the individual which exists in the real world. In fact, to judge whether a name has reference or not we should mainly be concerned about the concrete context.

关 键 词：名称 涵义 指称 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]