跳跃出价情形下多物品增价拍卖收益  

Research on Revenue of Multi-unit Ascending Auction under the Circumstance of Jump Bidding

作　　者：田剑[1,2] 唐小我[1] 马永开[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2008年第6期656-659,共4页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002);江苏省“青蓝工程”资助项目

摘　　要：针对拍卖中存在的跳跃投标现象,且跳跃投标对可能改变拍卖双方期望收益情况,以基于跳跃出价的两物品增价拍卖为例,研究了跳跃出价对投标方收益效应,计算了跳跃出价均衡下的投标方期望收益,并在同不存在跳跃出价进行比较的基础上,给出了投标方希望通过跳跃出价改善其期望收益的一般条件。Aiming at the phenomenon of jump bidding in multi-unit auctions which may change the expec- ted revenue of auctioneer and bidders, the paper studies effect of revenue of two-unit auction based on jump bidding. We calculate the expected revenue of bidder under the jump bidding equilibrium and compare it with that under non-jump bidding. The general condition under which bidders can use the tool to improve their expected revenues is given.

关 键 词：拍卖 独立私人价值 跳跃出价 均衡 期望收益 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济]